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Sex Discrimination in Private Clubs
The Scope of the Problem
I don't like my women for lunch. I like them for dessert.
- Unidentified Member,
San Francisco Commercial Club'
In an era of increasing egalitarianism, the exclusion of women
from private clubs remains anomalously pervasive. Private clubs ap-
pear in infinite variety and number;2 the list is as long as there are
groups of people with similar interests who associate in pursuit of that
interest.3 Clubs are organized on local, national, and international
1. Butler, Ladies Day at a Men's Club, S.F. Chronicle, Sept. 16, 1976, at 2,
col. 1. The comment was made in response to a sit-in demonstration at the San
Francisco Commercial Club sponsored by Women Organized for Employment in pro-
test of the discriminatory policies of the club. Among the protestors were San Fran-
cisco Municipal Court Judge Ollie Marie-Victoire and San Francisco Supervisor
Dorothy von Beroldingen. Id.
2. Professional organizations are not included within the scope of this Note.
Recent cases indicate a trend to compel admission to professional societies or associ-
tions where membership affects one's employment. See, e.g., Pinsker v. Pacific Coast
Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969); Falcone
v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961); Blatt v. Uni-
versity of S. Cal., 5 Cal. App. 3d 935, 85 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1970); see generally Sloss
& Becker, The Organization Affected With a Public Interest and Its Members - justice
Tobriners Contribution to Evolving Common Law Doctrine, 29 HAST. L.J. 99 (1977).
But cf. Kiwanis Club of Great Neck, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Kiwanis Int'l, 52 App.
Div. 2d 906, 383 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1976) (mem.), aff'g 83 Misc. 2d 1075, 374 N.Y.S.2d
265 (1975) (membership may not be compelled in Kiwanis on grounds that it is
a "commercial" club).
3. Inherent in such variety is the immediate problem of determining the bound-
aries of the word "private." The meaning varies when used in the legal context
of the first amendment, the fourteenth amendment, or with respect to "club."
The first amendment meaning of "private" broadly refers to those relationships
protected by the freedom of association. Conversely, the meaning of "private" in the
fourteenth amendment context is more narrowly circumscribed and refers to conduct
that is not significantly involved with the state. The meaning of "private" when used
with "club" has been described as an association "which is purely social in purpose,
or which has some single narrow purpose which benefits the selfish interests of its
members, such as golf clubs, social clubs, swimming clubs, recreational clubs, etc.,
and which establishes prior congeniality with those already members as a test of
membership eligibility." Kiwanis Club of Great Neck, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Kiwanis Int'l, 52 App. Div. 2d 906, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 387 (Shapiro, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
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bases, and many have memberships numbering in the hundreds of
thousands or in the millions. 4
The extent to which such organizations are truly private is the
critical variable. It is axiomatic that the essence of a private club is
exclusivity in the choice of one's associates. It is essential that truly
private clubs remain protected, however, those clubs that are in fact
quasi-private require close analysis in order to balance more equitably
the interest of women who are excluded and the interest in association
of men who are included.
How ever clubs may be characterized, it remains constant that
the impact of discrimination by private clubs upon women is both
profound and immediate. It is a problem of serious dimension that
is further complicated by its insidious nature: "Those 'sacred' men's
bars and lunchrooms are the embodiment of a strong idea: that
discrimination on the ground of sex is reasonable, even natural - not
as harmful, somehow, as racial or religious bias." 5
Exclusion is profoundly significant because private clubs are a
part of American life that to some degree touches each community
and each citizen. The denial to women of access to and participation
in this part of our culture contributes significantly to the perpetuation
of women's dependence and inferiority 6 because
4. As of April 30, 1977, there was a total membership in Rotary International
of 770,000. Telephone interview with Col. Robert S. Norris, Secretary, San Rafael
Rotary, Greenbrae, Cal., July 11, 1977. As of Dec. 1976, Kiwanis International had
286,545 members in over 7,000 chapters. Telephone interview with Kiwanis District
Office, Oakland, Cal., July 11, 1977. In 1977 the Jaycee organization had 325,000
members and the International Association of Lions Clubs claimed a membership of
1,036,802. WOnLD ALMANAC 334-47 (paperback ed. 1977).
Fraternal organizations are also well represented. As of 1977 there were
1,582,735 members of the Benevolent and Protective Orders of Elks, 1,478,672 mem-
bers of the Loyal Order of Moose, and 850,000 members of the Fraternal Order of
Eagles. Id.
From a fiscal point of view, the Jaycee organization had a total budget in 1974
of $3,639,000, $1,143,000 of which was furnished by the federal government. New
York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856, 858 (2d Cir.
1975).
Women are excluded from membership in Rotary, Kiwanis, Jaycees, Lions, Elks,
Moose, and Eagles.
5. Harkins, Sex and the City Council, NEW YoRsc MAcAZINE, April 27, 1970 at 10.
See generally Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16098 Before the Special Subcomm.
on Education of the Comm. on Education and Labor, Discrimination Against Women,
(pt. 2), 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 618 (1971) (remarks of Hon. Shirley Chisolm).
6. See generally, Karst, "A Discrimination So Trivial": A Note on Law and the
Symbolism of Women's Dependency, 49 L.A.B. BULL. 499 (1974). Although the doc-
trine of "separate but equal" has long been discredited in other situations, Gilmore v.
City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 568 (1974), it generally survives with acceptance
and apparent lack of concern in the realm of private clubs. One example of the
insidious nature of this type of discrimination is that "women's auxiliaries" apparently
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[i]nequality is harmful chiefly in its impact on the psyches of the
disadvantaged.... [W]hat really matters about inequality is
something that happens inside our heads: "The peculiar evil of
a relative deprivation . . . is psychic or moral; it consists of an
affront, it is immediately injurious insofar as resented or taken per-
sonally, and consequentially injurious insofar as demoralizing."
The exclusion of women has a more immediate impact when mem-
bership in a private club offers not only enhanced social status but the
opportunity to participate in the economic and civic affairs of the
community.8 The exclusion of women from private clubs that are
centers of commercial and community activity is prevalent and stems
from traditional male dominance in business and government. Be-
cause private clubs provide important sources of contact for business-
persons9 and are considered by some to be training grounds for new
go unquestioned. The Jaycee organization, for example, has a large and well-estab-
lished female counterpart, the Jaycettes.
Other second class treatment of women by private clubs is not unusual. In many
clubs women are permitted use of club facilities only on specified days of the week
or only during specified hours; in others women may use only designated stairways,
elevators, and rooms. See also Bennett v. Dyers Chop House, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 153
(N.D. Ohio 1972); Club Bars Visit of Mrs. Fong, L.A. Times, July 26, 1972, pt. IV,
at 4, col. 1. One golf player-celebrity, Ms. Dinah Shore, commented on her access
to semiprivate golf courses in Palm Springs, Cal.: "The good weekend starting times
are reserved for the men. Women can't tee off before 2 p.m. on Saturday and noon
on Sunday. They claim the men deserve early starting times because they work all
week and the weekends are their only chance to play. Well, I work all week, too,
and the weekends are my only chance to play, too." Click, Dinah, L.A. Times, April
16, 1974, pt. III, at 1, col. 2.
7. Karst, "A Discrimination So Trivial": A Note on Law and the Symbolism, of
Women's Dependency, 49 L.A.B. BULL. 499, 502-03 (1974) (quoting Michelman,
The Supreme Court, 1968 Term - Forward: "On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment," 83 H~nv. L. REv. 7, 49 (1969)).
8. "Social clubs have long been part of the American way of life. Not only
do they provide pleasant amenities for members, they are gathering places for the
establishment ...where respected and important members of the community come
together both socially and professionally. Thus the opportunity to join such a club
may be a necessity for continued success in employment or in other critical areas.
Because social club discrimination on the basis of religion does not stop there, [it
helps to foster] an attitude that spills over from the social sphere to business, the
professions, politics, and many other areas of life. Thus, the drive against social club
discrimination is not a matter of social climbing or even of ambition and the desire
to get ahead. It is an integral part of the mounting pressure for true equality."
DALE, THE CLOSED SOCITY (American Jewish Committee pamphlet 1969), quoted
in B. BAucocK, A. FREmfED, E. NORTON, S. Ross, SEx DISCIMINATION AND THE LAw
1057 (1975).
9. Johnson, Bias in the Country Club Set, Washington Post, Mar. 8, 1970, at
1, col. 1. "They are places where important business is transacted, where key pro-
fessional contacts are made. Those who are excluded are thus cut off from a large
part of both the decision-making and economic process." Id.
leaders in the corporate and governmental spheres, 10 exclusion tends
to impede women's achieving equal status in commercial and com-
munity activities. The exclusion of a segment of the population from
such private clubs works to severely limit the economic mobility of
that segment.1
This Note will examine the parameters of private club discrimina-
tion from the perspective of women. First, the constitutional frame-
work in which the conflict between private clubs and sex discrimina-
tion arises will be analyzed. Second, current statutory approaches to
resolution will be reviewed emphasizing emerging theories suggested
10. Domhoff, Playgrounds of the Powerful: How the Fat Cats Keep in Touch,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Aug. 1975, at 44, 47-48. Even the most fragmentary listing of
the membership in one West Coast private club is eloquently persuasive on this issue.
Members of the Bohemian Club hold positions, among many others, as the chairmen
of the boards of Bechtel Corporation, Southern California Edison, Kaiser Industries,
Continental Oil, Tenneco; the presidents of Wells Fargo Bank, Firestone, and Bank
of America; and directors of ITT, Stanford Research Institute, Urban Coalition, Mobil
Oil, Heinz, Morgan Guaranty Trust, Standard Oil of California, American Express,
General Telephone and Electronics, and Southern Pacific. Id.
Although many private clubs have "understood" rules that talk of politics or busi-
ness is forbidden and that the club's premises or facilities are not to be used for politics
or business, "inevitably they are." Clubs: The Ins and Outs, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10,
1977, at 18-19. The Cosmos Club in Washington, D.C., "prides itself on being the
site of discussions that later develop into public policy. Scientists Vannevar Bush
and James Bryan Conant used the club to discuss the historic Manhattan Project
on nuclear weapons. Current members include Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun,
Vice President Nelson Rockefeller and Attorney General Edward Levi." Id. at 19
(footnote omitted).
Two blocks from the White House is the Metropolitan Club with members from
the political, legal, and social elite of the Capitol. "[T]here are a 'great many' Jewish
members and 'several' blacks, according to a club official." Id. Women, however,
are excluded: "'As much as we love the girls,' says W. John Kenney, president of
Washington's Metropolitan Club, 'we just don't have the lavatory facilities to take
care of them and all the men who come in for lunch."' Id.
Although members at the Bohemian Club's annual summer encampment in the
Northern California redwoods are expressly forbidden to talk of politics, "the club's
rich and powerful male members . . . reportedly do a little dealing as they share
cocktails. In 1967, by some accounts, Ronald Reagan met fellow member Richard
Nixon there and agreed not to challenge Nixon in the early Presidential primaries of
1968." Id. William Domhoff, University of California sociologist, has observed:
"These carefree get-togethers .. .provide the cement that helps bind together many
of the rulers of America so that they can shape and influence national and corporate
policies." Id.
11. "Male lawyers, especially from Wall Street, are loathe to be quoted on this
matter of private clubs, but one criminal lawyer explains: 'This is a clan matter be-
tween lawyers and other lawyers. The good old boys in the Wall Street firms are
so concerned about their places of refreshment because they fear the possibility of
women or outsiders becoming privy to their private deals . . . and deals are what
it's all about."' Taming the Lions in the Street with Title VII, Juus DocTOR, Sept.
1976, at 9.
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An allegation of unconstitutional sex discrimination made against
a private club will face the defense that the club is private and thus
protected by the freedom of association. Unless a club is truly private
in every way, however, freedom of association will not protect it.
Should the freedom of association defense fail, the challenger of con-
stitutionality must satisfy the elements of the fourteenth amendment
in which the threshold question is whether there is sufficient state
action to justify its application. If the state action requirement is met,
the challenger must show a denial of equal protection.
These requirements are so burdensome that a constitutional at-
tack on the legality of sex discrimination in private clubs has slight
potential for success. It is perhaps most indicative of the potential
of any constitutional approach to sex discrimination in private clubs
that no cases have survived the threshold state action requirement.
The Freedom of Association
At the heart of this case is a conflict between two profound claims
of right. Plaintiff contends that he has a right to be evaluated in
his application for membership as a person and not as a black
person. Perceiving that Cornelius is attempting to storm the
citadel, the Elks and Moose stand antler to antler in asserting a
constitutional right to discriminate on the basis of race with regard
to their membership decisions.
- Blumenfeld, D. J.12
The freedom of association is a pervasive theme in the private
club-sex discrimination context. It properly serves to protect truly
private associations from attack on constitutional or state statutory
grounds.18 In a free society it is the right of each citizen to associate
12. Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of the Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182,
1187 (D. Conn. 1974).
13. The first amendment is one source of the right of freedom of association that
can be used as the constitutional basis for private clubs to discriminate. Other the-
oretical bases have been suggested for the origin of the freedom of association in-
cluding the ninth amendment and traditional concepts of substantive due process.
See Comment, Association, Privacy and the Private Club: The Constitutional Con-
flict, 5 HA v. C.R.-C.L. L. 1Ev. 460, 465-66 (1970). The due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment secures these freedoms from abridgement by the states. Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The freedom of association has evolved
from cases interpreting the first amendment; it is not a freedom expressly guaranteed
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with whomever he or she wishes to relate in a close, personal, social,
and continuing way.14 This constitutional protection applies to gen-
uinely private clubs and extends to include any close, personal group
of intimates who have joined together, to the exclusion of others, for
the sake of mutual association.
The scope of the freedom of association has evolved to include
the freedom to associate exclusively:
The associational rights which our system honors permit all white,
all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed. They also
permit all Catholic, all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs to be estab-
lished. Government may not tell a man or woman who his or
her associates must be. The individual can be as selective as he
desires. 15
Freedom of association may be restricted, however, if there are im-
portant countervailing interests. 16 The character and extent of any
interference with the freedom of association must be weighed against
the countervailing interests.
The Constitution, for example, does not give anyone an unre-
stricted right of choice of those with whom he or she is likely to come
into daily contact.17 Freedom of association will not support the ex-
by the Constitution. Its explicit recognition as a separate constitutionally protected
freedom arose from the United States Supreme Court's decision in NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958). In that case the state attempted to compel disclosure of mem-
bership lists of the NAACP by forcing it to turn over a list of its members in that
state. The effect of such compulsion, the Court found, was to inhibit the exercise
of first amendment freedoms, specifically, the right to join together for the purpose
of self expression. The Court noted that the freedom to associate for the advancement
of beliefs and ideas is "beyond debate." Id. at 460.
14. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
See generally Sengstock & Sengstock, Discrimination: A Constitutional Dilemma,
9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 59, 116-25 (1967); Note, Association, Privacy and the Private
Club: The Constitutional Conflict, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 460, 466 (1970).
15. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting), quoted with approval in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556,
575 (1974).
16. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974). Although
it has been suggested that first amendment freedoms are "absolute," this view has
not been adopted by a majority of the Court. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 482-85 (1957); P. KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 114-17
(1962). Accordingly, the exercise of first amendment rights may be subjected to
reasonable regulation as to time, place, and manner of exercise. See, e.g., Breard
v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303-04 (1940); Note, Public Rental to Discriminating Groups, 44 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 239, 244-45 (1976). See generally Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State
Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 328, 337-39
(1963).
17. "Some forced associations are inevitable in an industrial society. One who
[Vol. 29
November 1977] SEX DISCRIMINATION IN PRIVATE CLUBS
clusion of any segment of society from a public place such as a restau-
rant. The public nature of such a place demonstrates that the owner's
interest in privacy is slight compared to the right of access to public
places regardless of one's color or sex.'" These situations are distin-
guishable from genuinely private associational relationships because
of the radically different interests at issue.19
Although the freedom of association should act as a shield for
genuinely private clubs, in those instances where a so-called private
club is, in fact, quasi-private, courts should be more sensitive to the
interests at issue. In a businessman's luncheon club, for example, the
male's interest in excluding women for business reasons, as opposed
to personal reasons, must be carefully scrutinized. In a club that
permits members to bring in any nonfemale member of the public,
especially when this occurs in a business setting, the members' interest
in privacy and free association is abrogated because members have no
control over one another's nonfemale guests.2 0  The public nature of
such a quasi-private club, like that of a restaurant, demonstrates that
the males' interest in exclusive association is slight compared to the
females' right of access to public places.
A valid freedom of association claim will serve as a complete
defense to a private club's discriminatory conduct if there is no signi-
ficant state involvement with the club.21  If state action is shown,
however, only conduct that is not violative of equal protection is pro-
tected by the freedom of association. 22  It is at the crucial point of
examining equal protection that courts weigh the interests of those
who are included against the interests of those who are excluded.
of necessity rides buses and street cars does not have the freedom that John Muir and
Walt Whitman extolled." International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,
775 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
18. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 286 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Justice Goldberg noted: "This is not a claim which significantly impinges upon
personal associational interests. . . . The broad acceptance of the public in this and
in other restaurants clearly demonstrates that the proprietor's interest in private or
unrestricted association is slight. . .. The history and the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment compel the conclusion that the right to be served in places of public
accommodation regardless of color cannot constitutionally be subordinated to the pro-
prietor's interest in discriminatorily refusing service." Id. at 313-15. See also [1964]
U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2495.
19. The interests at stake in the context of sex discrimination have been described
as those relating to "one's sense of individuality, independence and self-worth."
Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of America, 275 Ore. 327, 551 P.2d 465, 474 (1976). See
also Karst, "A Discrimination So Trivial": A Note on Law and the Symbolism of
Wome's Dependency, 49 L.A.B. BuLL. 499 (1974).
20. See notes 143-47 & accompanying text infra.
21. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 573-74 (1974).
22. Id. at 576.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The Fourteenth Amendment
I ask no favors for my sex. All I ask of our brethren is that they
take their feet off our necks.
- Sarah Grimke2 3
By its terms, the mandate of the fourteenth amendment that
"[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws" 24 is limited to acts of states.25  As a
result, purely private acts of discrimination are not within the ambit
of the fourteenth amendment. 26  Accurate definition of state action
and equal protection is needed in order precisely to determine the
constitutional boundaries of the regulation of private conduct.
State Action Analysis
There is no general formulation of the amount of state involve-
ment sufficient to find state action.27 Although the United States
23. S. GPJMKE, LETTErnS ON THE EQUALITY OF THE SEXES AND THE CONDITION
OF WOMEN (addressed to Mary Parker, Pres. of the Boston Female Anti-Slavery
Soc'y 10 (1838)), quoted in Elsen, Coogan & Ginsburg, Men, Women, and the Con-
stitution: The Equal Rights Amendment, 10 CoLum. J.L. & Soc. PnOB. 77, 99 (1974).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
25. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-79 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
26. Some purely private acts of discrimination have been reached. See, e.g.,
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968). In Jones the Supreme Court barred discrimination against blacks in
the sale or rental of property by private persons and based its holding upon § 1982
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Similarly, § 1981 of the 1866 Act has been con-
strued to reach private racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts.
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). But cf. Cornelius v. Benevolent Pro-
tective Order of the Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Conn. 1972) (membership in private
fraternal organization may not be secured by suit brought under § 1981).
In the area of sex discrimination, private discrimination has been reached in em-
ployment (Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-
17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)), housing (Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631
(1970 & Supp. V 1975), and credit opportunity (Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691e (Supp. V 1977)). For an excellent discussion of the potential
applicability of racial civil rights legislation to the problems of sex discrimination see
Calhoun, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments: Constitutional Authority for
Federal Legislation Against Private Sex Discrimination, 61 MINN. L. REV. 313 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Calhoun].
27. "While the principle is easily stated, the question of whether particular dis-
criminatory conduct is private, on the one hand, or amounts to 'state action,' on the
other hand, frequently admits of no easy answer. 'Only by sifting facts and weigh-
ing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be
attributed its true significance.'" Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172
(1972) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)).
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Supreme Court has delegated to lower courts the task of case by case
analysis of state action, 28 the Court gradually has narrowed what may
be fairly characterized to be state action. 29  Several theories that
categorize circumstances in which state action may be found have
been articulated and refined. Each theory has been advanced in
private club litigation.
In 1946 the Court held that a private entity satisfied the state
action requirement because it acted as the functional equivalent of
the state.30  The effectiveness of the theory, however, has been vir-
tually obviated by the Court's decision in Hudgens v. National Labor
Relations Board.31  In Hudgens, union picketing within a large shop-
ping center was prohibited by its owner. The NLRB, agreeing with
the union, found that this prohibition unconstitutionally infringed upon
freedom of speech.32  On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
rejected the contention that the shopping center was functionally
equivalent to the state stating: "The Constitution by no means re-
quires such an attenuated doctrine of dedication of private property
to public use."33  An attempt to extend the public function theory of
state action to private club situations would thus appear to be futile
in light of Hudgens.3 4
28. Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16, 19 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)).
29. See notes 72-75 & accompanying text infra.
30. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). This case involved an attempt
to regulate distribution of religious literature within the borders of a company owned
town. Although the town was privately owned, the Court found that it was the func-
tional equivalent of any municipality and therefore was subject to the fourteenth
amendment. Id.
31. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
32. Id. at 509-10.
33. Id. at 519 (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972)).
Marsh, however, was distinguished as a situation in which all of the attributes of a
state municipality had been assumed by the private entity. Thus, the public function
theory of state action remains viable in an extremely narrow factual context. 424 U.S.
at 515-17.
34. In one action involving a municipal lease of bay bottom land underlying
a private club's dock facilities, the plaintiff proceeded on a public function theory and
sought to have the policy of racial and religious discrimination of the club declared
unconstitutional. Although the district court found that the club did perform a pub-
lic function by providing private dock space that would relieve overcrowded public
docks, this argument was summarily dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Golden v.
Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16, 17 (5th Cir. 1976), reversing 370 F. Supp.
1038 (S.D. Fla. 1973). But see Smith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 316 F. Supp.
899 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd as modified, 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972). In Smith,
a statute allowed a nominally private organization to perform public functions in an
effort to circumvent desegregation orders issued to the parks and recreation authorities
of Montgomery, Alabama. 462 F.2d at 641-42. Because of the statutory nature of
the state involvement, this decision probably remains valid. See also Korzenik v.
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Nearly twenty years after the formulation of the public function
doctrine, the Court advanced a new standard in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority.35 Burton involved racial discrimination by a
restaurant that leased space in a state owned and maintained building
dedicated to public use. The rent helped to finance the construction
of the building, and the restaurant received tax benefits as a lessee in
a state building.36 The Supreme Court concluded that this mutually
advantageous or symbiotic relationship between the state and the
private entity would satisfy the state action requirement.37  The con-
Marrow, 401 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), in which the women of Scarsdale, New
York alleged that an organization known as The Town Club performed a public func-
tion because of the role it played in the town's electoral process.
35. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
36. Id. at 719-20.
37. Id. at 725. This standard has been frequently relied upon in private club-
state action analyses which focus upon financial assistance to the club in the form of
tax benefits. See, e.g., Falkenstein v. Oregon Dep't of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887
(D. Ore. 1972) (three-judge court), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Oregon State Elks
Ass'n v. Falkenstein, 409 U.S. 1099 (1973); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448
(D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge court); Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp.
662 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (three-judge court). The argument is simple: Tax exemp-
tion concessions are granted as a quid pro quo to the private club in return for its
performance of services that are normally expected by the public and that otherwise
would be the responsibility of the state. Brunson v. Rutherford Lodge No. 547,
128 N.J. Super. 66, 319 A.2d 80 (1974). In Brunson, taxpayers and citizens chal-
lenged the property tax exemption that had been granted to an Elks Club that
applied a racially discriminatory membership policy. The court found that the tax
exemption impermissibly involved the state in private racial discrimination: "In this
State it has long been recognized that there is a symbiotic relationship between the
State and the exempt organization and that the latter is relieved from the burden of
taxation because it is practically performing a public work which the State would
otherwise have to perform." Id. at 85-86, 319 A.2d at 91. The court found that the
charitable and educational programs of the club were public works that the state
would otherwise have had to perform. Id.
It has been suggested, however, that a definitional double standard currently
used in judicial approaches to the state action analysis makes it easier for courts
to find state action in cases involving racial discrimination than in those involving sex
discrimination. Calhoun, supra note 26, at 338. This seems to be borne out by two
recent circuit court decisions that have held that tax benefits to private organizations
that discriminate against women do not constitute state action. New York City Jay-
cees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856, 859 (2d Cir. 1975); Junior
Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883,
886-87 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974). Courts in both cases relied
on Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), a case that challenged a property tax
exemption to religious organizations. The Supreme Court held that this action did
not constitute government "sponsorship" because there was no nexus between the
exemption and the establishment of religion. 397 U.S. at 675-76. The Rochester
court concluded: "In the case at bar the exemption granted to the United States
Jaycees would be even less subject to constitutional attack than would an exemption
granted to a church, for in the [Walzl case the proscriptions of the First Amendment
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tinued application of this theory is questionable, however, as a result
of the Supreme Court's recent indications that the symbiosis test is
limited to the facts in Burton.38
Recently, the Court has held that in the absence of a public func-
tion or a symbiotic relationship there must be a cause and effect re-
lationship between the action of the state and a specific discriminatory
activity on the part of the private entity.39 This test was advanced by
the Court in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,40 a case involving a private
club and racial discrimination. A member of the Moose Lodge and
his four guests were refused dining room service because a member of
the party, Mr. Irvis, is black. Irvis sued in federal court 4' on the
theory that state action could be found in the grant of a liquor license
to the lodge. The Court concluded that there was neither a public
function performed by the lodge nor was there a symbiotic relation-
ship that existed between the state and the lodge.42  After considering
the relationship between the alleged state action and the discrimina-
tory activity of the lodge, the Court found that there was no connection
expressly require the separation of church and state." 495 F.2d at 888. Thus, it
would seem that to find state action in the form of tax benefits in a racial discrim-
ination-private club case courts will continue to utilize the Burton analysis as the court
did in Brunson. In cases of private club-sex discrimination, however, it appears that
courts will apply the nexus requirement as was done in New York City Jaycees and
Rochester.
38. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974). See also
New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975)
(tax benefits not equivalent of public functions and reliance upon that theory mis-
placed). The tax exempt status of private clubs under the 1976 Tax Reform Act
is discussed at notes 160-67 & accompanying text infra. But see Braden v. University
of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977), in which the Third Circuit construed
Jackson as not completely overruling Burton: "The implication arising from such
efforts at differentiation is not that Burton was supplanted by Jackson, but rather that
Burton remained as a powerful precedent with which the Court had to contend." Id.
at 957-58. In Braden the Third Circuit afarned the trial court's finding that the issue
of state action, for purposes of a Civil Rights Act discrimination in employment charge,
could not be summarily dismissed. In that case the court found significant the Penn-
sylvania statutory scheme related to the university: "[lit is hereby declared to be
the purpose of this act to extend Commonwealth opportunities for higher education
by establishing University of Pittsburgh as an instrumentality of the Commonwealth
to serve as a State-related institution in the Commonwealth system of higher educa-
tion." Id. at 959 (quoting PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 2510-202 (Purden Supp. 1976))
(emphasis supplied by court).
39. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
40. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
41. Irvis v. Scott, 318 F. Supp. 1246 (M.D. Pa. 1970). Irvis simultaneously
filed suit in state court on a different theory. See notes 132-47 & accompanying text
infra.
42. 407 U.S. at 175.
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between the state's grant of the license, its only link with the club, and
the club's discriminatory membership policies.43  Because the Penn-
sylvania liquor licensing statute was not intended to encourage dis-
crimination, there was no state action involved."
Two years after Moose Lodge the Supreme Court in Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co.45 crystalized the nexus concept: "The in-
quiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the
action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."46
In Jackson the Court failed to find significant state action in the act
of terminating service to a consumer by a privately owned utility.
The Court used a seriatum approach as a means of considering each
state action theory.47 Because the state statute involved imposed no
obligation upon the state to furnish utilities, the Court found that the
utility performed no public function. 48  Further, the Court declined
to extend the public function theory to businesses, such as utility com-
panies, that are "affected with the public interest."49  The Court con-
cluded that there was no symbiotic relationship between the state
and the utility by noting that the Burton decision has been limited to
situations involving the lease of public property."  Finally, the Court
held that no nexus existed between state and utility because there was
no proof that the state intended either overtly or covertly to encourage
the utility practice of service termination.51
43. Id. at 175-77.
44. Id. at 173. An example of a state liquor license statute that patently involved
the state is found in Women's Liberation Union v. Israel, 379 F. Supp. 44 (D.R.I.
1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1975). In that case the Union sought a declara-
tory judgment that a state statute regulating the sale of alcoholic beverages was un-
constitutional and violative of the fourteenth amendment. The statute subjected a
class of liquor licensees to criminal sanction and disqualification from holding a license
if they allowed any woman to drink beverages on the premises. For a discussion
of current attempts to control discrimination in private clubs through use of state
power to regulate liquor licensing see notes 175-76 & accompanying text infra.
45. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
46. Id. at 351 (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)).
47. Justice Douglas dissented in Jackson because the seriatum analysis employed
by the majority was insufficient. Instead, it should be the state action factors con-
sidered in the aggregate that control. 419 U.S. at 360 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
For cases following the Jackson seriatum method see Magill v. Avonworth Baseball
Conference, 516 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1975); New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United
States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975). But see Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522
F.2d 397, 407 n.12 (2d Cir. 1975); Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
48. 419 U.S. at 352-53.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 357-58.
51. Id. at 357 n.17.
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Recent cases involving private club-state action analyses indi-
cate the formidable nature of the state action requirement. Cases
from the second,52 eighth,53 and tenth 54 circuits involving the Junior
Chamber of Commerce (Jaycees) organization and its practice of
discriminating against women as members are illustrative.
The first case, Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc.
v. United States Jaycees,5 5 was an attempt by a local Jaycee chapter
in Rochester, New York, to compel its reinstatement after its expulsion
from the national organization because it admitted women as mem-
bers. Members of the local alleged state action in the form of tax
exemptions and federal grants.56  They further claimed that they were
being deprived of the opportunity to take part in the charitable work
of the national organization, which received some federal funding. 57
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found no
merit to these allegations because it failed to find any nexus between
the discriminatory membership policy and the alleged state action.58
The court suggested that under a proper set of circumstances a suffi-
cient nexus could be found, for example if a private club received
state funds and distributed them in a discriminatory manner.5 9
The second case, Junior Chamber of Commerce of Kansas City
v. Missouri State Junior Chamber of Commerce,0 was an action
brought by another local chapter to enjoin the cancellation of its
contract with the national organization. Kansas City was to be the
site of the Jaycee national convention honoring its Ten Outstanding
Young Men.6 ' One month after the contract for the convention was
signed, maldng the agreement subject to the United States Jaycee's
bylaws, the local Kansas City chapter amended its bylaws to admit
women as members. Subsequently, the National Executive Commit-
tee cancelled the contract, giving as one of its reasons the granting of
membership rights to women by the local. -6 2  The trial court found
that significant state action was present because federal grants were
utilized by the United States Jaycees to fund many of their national pro-
52. New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856
(2d Cir. 1975).
53. Junior Chamber of Commerce of Kansas City v. Missouri State Junior Chamber
of Commerce, 508 F.2d 1031 (8th Cir. 1975).
54. Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v. United States Jaycees,
495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 884.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 888.
59. Id.
60. 508 F.2d 1031 (8th Cir. 1974).
61. Id. at 1032.
62. Id.
grams.63  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
however, held that there was no state action and rested its decision on
the fact that there was no nexus between the receipt of federal funds
and the holding of the Jaycee Congress.34  This court considered,
as did the Rochester court before it, the circumstances that might
coalesce to produce a nexus sufficient to show state action. Relying
upon Moose Lodge and Jackson the court concluded that even a nexus
between the administration of federal funds, with the attendant loss
of opportunity for leadership training, and the exclusion of women
would fall short of the requisite quantum of state action. 5
The final case occurred two months after the Kansas City case.
In New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc.,6 6 another
local chapter sued its national organization to enjoin the revocation of
its charter because it admitted women as members. The local charged
that the national's receipt of federal funds and tax exemptions, and its
performance of certain civic functions constituted sufficient state action
to prohibit its discrimination against women as members. 7 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed and
found that the Jaycees did not perform public functions,6 8 that no
Burton symbiosis existed, " and that there was no nexus between the
funds and tax exemptions received and the membership policies of
the organization.-0  In reasoning that is applicable to each Jaycee
case, the Second Circuit concluded:
In this case the requisite connection between government and the
offending activity has not been shown. Plaintiff does not charge
discrimination in the operation of federally funded Jaycee pro-
grams; indeed such a claim could not be supported since not only
do women participate both in the selection of local recipients for
funding and in the implementation of programs, but also the bene-
63. Id. The national programs include: "(1) Operation Threshold, an alco-
holic rehabilitation and awareness program. (2) Project Mainstream, relating to aid
to the disadvantaged. (3) Environmental program sponsored by H.E.W. (4) A
venereal disease awareness program. (5) Criminal Justice program designed to as-
sist inmates and ex-offenders." Id. at 1032 n.2.
64. Id. at 1033.
65. "It may well be that, in administering these federally financed programs,
Jaycees in each local chapter are given an opportunity to develop and maintain leader-
ship qualities which will be beneficial to them in business, and that women are now
being deprived of the right to thus improve themselves. But, as heretofore stated,
that is not the sufficiently 'close nexus' required by Jackson and Moose Lodge, to con-
stitute state (governmental) action and thus fall within the ambit of the due process
requirement of the fifth amendment." Id. (citations omitted).
66. 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975).
67. Id. at 858.
68. Id. at 859-60.
69. Id. at 859.
70. Id.
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fits of all federally funded Jaycee programs are distributed with-
out regard to sex or other impermissible discriminatory criteria.
Plaintiff's constitutional challenge is addressed solely to the in-
ternal membership policies of the Jaycees; yet plaintiff has made
no showing that the government is substantially, or even mini-
mally, involved in the adoption or enforcement of these policies.71
The Jaycee cases illustrate that there must be some nexus between
the state action, regardless of its form, and the specific discriminatory
activity on the part of a private entity. Some relationship must be
established between the funds received from the state and their use
in a discriminatory manner.
The state action requirement is formidable when viewed in
its entirety. The public function theory has been so narrowed by
Hudgens that its current applicability is extremely limited. 72  The
symbiotic relationship theory has similarily been restricted in appli-
cation, specifically by the Jackson Court, which limited Burton to
cases involving leases of public property.7 3 The Jackson application
of the seriatum analysis and the formulation of the nexus requirement
indicate that these two elements are now indispensible parts of state
action analysis.74  Finally, the practical difficulties of surmounting the
satisfaction of the state action requirement are well demonstrated by
the Jaycee cases. 75 It appears that a constitutional attack upon sex
discrimination in a private club based upon a theory of state action
will succeed only in a very limited set of circumstances.
Equal Protection Analysis
The United States Supreme Court has relied upon an evolving
series of tests to determine whether state action violates the equal pro-
tection clause. Historically, in the area of economic and social regu-
latory legislation, the Court has taken the view that equal protection
will be denied only if classifications bear no reasonable relation to a
legitimate state purpose.76  The burden of proving this lack of rea-
sonable relation is on the party challenging the regulation.77 In other
areas, the Court has determined that state action that discriminates
against certain classes or that touches upon fundamental rights violates
equal protection unless it is justified by a compelling state interest.78
71. Id. (footnotes omitted).
72. See notes 30-34 & accompanying text supra.
73. See notes 35-38 & accompanying text supra.
74. See notes 45-48 & accompanying text supra.
75. See notes 52-71 & accompanying text supra.
76. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40
(1973); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1971).
77. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
78. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 331, 342 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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The heavy burden of proving a compelling state interest rests with the
party defending the regulation. 79
Classifications based upon sex have not been regarded as suspect
by a majority of the Court. 0 Accordingly, the great body of case law
that treats the issue of sex discrimination and equal protection has been
decided on the basis of the rational relationship test.8 ' The Supreme
Court recently articulated a third equal protection test that may be
used in addressing gender-based classification.8 2  Under this test,
equal protection is violated unless the classification by gender serves
important governmental objectives and is substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.13
The effect of this new intermediate test for equal protection is
not likely to be felt in the area of sex discrimination in private clubs
because the prerequisite for the application of a test for equal pro-
tection, state action, is rarely found in this context. To date, no case
involving sex discrimination in private clubs has survived the thresh-
old scrutiny for the presence of state action.8 4
It is illustrative, however, to speculate as to the effect of the inter-
mediate test in a case in which the state action requirement is met.
Assume, for example, that a national service organization takes a por-
79. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16
(1973).
80. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973).
81. Compare Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390
F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Gruenwald v. Cohen, 393 U.S. 982
(1968) and Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) with United States ex tel. Robinson
v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); Karczewski v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 274 F.
Supp. 169 (N.D. Ill. 1967); White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
82. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Craig the Court determined that
a state statute that prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of twenty-
one and to females under the age of eighteen denied to eighteen-to-twenty year old
males equal protection in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Stewart and Blackmun concurred.
Justice Powell concurred separately and reluctantly endorsed the intermediate standard
for gender classification. Justice Stevens concurred in the opinion but rejected the
"rational basis," "intermediate," and "compelling state interest" tests in favor of one
standard. Chief Justice Burger dissented and rejected the placing of gender classi-
fications into a "disfavored" category. Justice Rehnquist dissented on the grounds
that gender classifications need only pass a "rational basis" test.
83. "To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classi-
fications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be sub-
stantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 197.
84. In Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.
N.Y. 1970), a public bar that was licensed by the state was found to violate the
equal protection clause because of its policy of refusing to serve women. Although
Seidenberg was decided two years before Moose Lodge, Seidenberg is distinguishable
because the tavern was a public place.
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tion of the federal funds that it, receives and gives one half in scholar-
ships to promising young men who plan careers in law and one half in
scholarships to promising young women who plan careers in medicine.
If this distribution is challenged the organization must show that these
classifications serve important governmental interests and that they
are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. Al-
though the service organization may argue that its activity is in fur-
therance of the important objective of higher education it cannot
meet the requirement of the new test that the classification serve an
important governmental objective. The gender-based classifications
created in this hypothetical appear to serve no governmental interest
because there are men who plan careers in medicine as well as
in law and, conversely, women who plan careers in law as well as
in medicine. Because it is the discriminatory distribution of state
funds that is at issue here and because there is no apparent justifica-
tion for the classifications created by the organizations, the distribu-
tion method could violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.3 5
85. It is appropriate at this point to consider the equal rights amendment and
its potential impact upon sex discrimination by private clubs. The proposed amend-
ment provides:
1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any state on account of sex.
2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. proposed amend. XXVII. It has been suggested that the similarity in
language between this proposed amendment and the fourteenth amendment indicates
that the two amendments would be construed similarly. Calhoun, supra note 26,
at 324 n.55; see Elsen, Coogan & Ginsburg, Men, Women, and the Constitution: The
Equal Rights Amendment, 10 CoLum. J.L. & Soc. PRoB. 77 (1974). Like the four-
teenth, however, the proposed amendment addresses state action alone. Accordingly,
the equal rights amendment would afford little immediate relief to those who would
attack private clubs on sex discrimination charges primarily because of the state action
requirement.
Section two of the proposed amendment is perhaps the most significant provision
for the issue of sex discrimination in private clubs. The power to legislate enforce-
ment of the amendment would give Congress direct power to proscribe private acts
of sex discrimination, an authority that is comparable to the present power of Congress
to regulate private acts of racial discrimination. See generally Calhoun, supra note 26.
The equal rights amendment, in order to become a part of the Constitution, must
be ratified by thirty-eight states by March, 1979. As of June 30, 1977, thirty-five
states had approved the amendment. L.A. Times, June 30, 1977, at 2, col. 4.
For differing interpretations of the potential effects of the proposed amendment
compare Elsen, Coogan & Ginsburg, Men, Women, and the Constitution: The Equal
Rights Amendment, 10 CoLum. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 77 (1974) and Calhoun, supra note
26, with Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment Is Not the Way, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 234, 237-38 (1971) and Kurland, The Equal Rights Amendment: Some Prob-
lems of Construction, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 243 (1971).
Constitutional Summary
The doctrine of freedom of association will operate to shield a
club that discrimates against women if the club is not significantly
involved with the state. In cases in which a private club is signifi-
cantly involved with the state, courts in balancing the freedom of
association against equal protection should favor the latter. It has
been shown, however, that in the context of private clubs the state
action requirement, a prerequisite to the invocation of the equal pro-
tection test, is almost impossible to meet under present definitional
constraints. 86
Statutory Framework
In contrast to constitutional approaches, statutory schemes sug-
gest potentially successful new theories for use in cases involving
sex discrimination in private clubs.
Federal Legislation
Federal legislation prohibiting sex discrimination may be briefly
summarized as prohibiting discrimination against women in the areas
of employment, T housing,8 credit opportunity,89 and education. 90
With a few notable exceptions the mass of "resurrected nineteenth
century civil rights statutes" 91 and the civil rights legislation emanating
from the civil rights movement of the 1960's "2 is not applicable to
discrimination based on sex. As a result there is no federal law that
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in areas such as the sale
of property, the right to enforce and make contracts, and the right of
access to public accommodations.
The federal public accommodations law,9 3 contained in the Civil
86. See notes 72-75 & accompanying text supra.
87. Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17
(1970 & Supp. V 1975).
88. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1970 & Supp. V
1975).
89. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691e (Supp. V 1977).
90. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. V 1975). See aiso id. §§ 1701-1718, 1720-21.
91. Calhoun, supra note 26, at 315.
92. This legislation included the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284,
82 Stat. 81, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
93. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a
through 2000a-6 (1970)). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 relied on the commerce
clause and not the power of Congress to regulate under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 270-71
(1964); Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333, 1340 (2d Cir. 1974);
Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 351-53 (5th Cir. 1968).
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Rights Act of 1964, 4 includes a prototype exemption clause for private
clubs.95 This law does not prohibit sex discrimination but is none-
theless relevant because cases interpreting it have focused on delineat-
ing elements inherent in a truly private club. These elements have
generally been adopted by state courts in cases involving private clubs
that are brought on the basis of state statutes prohibiting sex dis-
crimination in places of public accommodation. 0
Prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides
that no person may be discriminated against on the basis of race, color,
religion, or national origin in places of public accommodation, 97 there
was no law in this country that prohibited racial discrimination in
public places. Congress expressed concern that the Act's passage
might infringe upon first amendment rights of association. 8 Congress
questioned the constitutionality of legislation that did not limit this
potential encroachment 9 and consequently exempted private clubs
and establishments not open to the public from the Act's application. 00
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(a),(c),(f)-(g), 1975a-1975d, 2000a through 2000a-6,
2000b through 2000b-3, 2000c, 2000c-2 through 2000c-9, 2000d through 2000d-4,
2000e through 2000e-17, 2000f, 2000g through 2000g-3, 2000h through 2000h-6 (1970
& Supp. V 1975).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970).
96. See, e.g., Kiwanis Club of Great Neck, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Kiwanis
Int'l, 83 Misc. 2d 1075, 1077, 374 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 52
App. Div. 2d 906, 383 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1976).
97. The Public Accommodations Law provides: "All persons shall be entitled
to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section,
without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970).
98. See H.R. REP. No. 914, pt. 2, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 9 (1963), reprinted
in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEvs 2495: "Moreover, where freedom of associa-
tion might logically come into play as in cases of private organizations, title II quite
properly exempts bona fide private clubs and other establishments."
99. See, e.g., 110 CONG. Rac. 2293 (1964) (remarks of Representative Long of
Louisiana). Senator Humphrey responded: "Title II . . . is designed to reach
the most significant manifestations of discrimination. It is carefully drafted and
moderate in nature. There is no desire to regulate truly personal or private relation-
ships. . . . This does not mean that discrimination in the operation of such facilities
is any more defensible or moral than elsewhere, but merely that discrimination in such
establishments is not of major dimension, especially when compared with the other
problems with which title II and the bill as a whole deals." Id. at 6534. See [1964]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2495.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970). The statute initially exempts any club that
is truly private. There is, however, an exception to the exemption if any private club
opens its facilities to the public. It is significant that in the decade since the passage
of the Civil Rights Act case law has focused on the first phrase of the exception.
There appears to have been no litigation involving the second phrase. Kramer, Con-
struction and Application of f 201(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. J
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This statute has been the primary focus of extensive litigation
between blacks and private clubs throughout the country. Blacks
challenging membership policies of the clubs assert that they are not
in fact private, whereas clubs maintain that because members are
joined together with close associational ties they retain the right to
exclude whomever they please under the exemption. The federal
decisions have focused on the definitional issue of what is a "private"
club.
Cases interpreting the private club exemption clause have de-
lineated certain criteria to be used in judicially determining whether
a club is truly private: selectiveness in membership, membership
control, use of the club's facilities, and individual considerations.
The more selective the membership is the more likely it is that
the club is private. 10 1 In this regard a court will look to the measure
of control that members play in the selection 10 2 and rejection of new
members, 10 3 the existence of formal membership procedures,10 4 the
standard of qualifications for membership, 1'05 and the substantiality of
membership dues.106
The more a club takes on the characteristics of a business the less
likely it is that it will be found to be private.'01 This criterion also
incorporates several factors including the ownership of club property °8
2000a(e)), Excluding From the Act's Coverage Private Clubs and Other Establish-
ments Not in Fact Open to the Public, 8 A.L.R. Fed. 634, 638 n.5 (1971).
101. See Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Johnson Lake, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1376, 1378-79 (S.D. Ala. 1970); United States v.
Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90, 92-93 (E.D. La. 1967).
102. See United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1968); Bell v.
Kenwood Golf and Country Club, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 753, 756, 758 (D. Md. 1970);
Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1147, 1151-52 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
103. See United States v. Johnson Lake Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (S.D. Ala.
1970); Bell v. Kenwood Golf and Country Club, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 753, 756 (D. Md.
1970); Williams v. Rescue Fire Co., Inc., 254 F. Supp. 556, 561 (D. Md. 1966).
104. See Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96, 101 (4th Cir. 1968); Stout v. YMCA,
404 F.2d 687, 688 (5th Cir. 1968); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1151
(S.D. Tex. 1970).
105. See Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96, 101 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1968); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp.
1143, 1151 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
106. See United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Johnson Lake Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (S.D. Ala. 1970); United States
v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90, 93 (E.D. La. 1967).
107. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301 (1969); United States v. Jack Sabin's
Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90, 92-93 (E.D. La. 1967).
108. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301 (1969); Bell v. Kenwood Golf and
Country Club, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 753, 754, 758 (D. Md. 1970); United States 'v.
Johnson Lake Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1376, 1378 (S.D. Ala. 1970).
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and the extent that members, as opposed to outside managers, exercise
direct control over spending of club revenues. 10 9
For a club to be considered private a court will require a bond
to exist among members that is stronger than mere patronage of the
same facility." 0 In addition, if nonmembers are regularly admitted
as guests without having to become members, the club is less likely
to be considered truly private. 1
Some courts have considered individual characteristics of clubs
in determining the private status question. For example, in an in-
stance in which a club was apparently formed in an effort to evade
civil rights legislation several courts have considered the history of
the organization." 2  In other cases the fact that the club advertised
publicly was dispositive of the private status issue." 3
These criteria are by no means fixed; the evolutionary process that
began with the passage of the Civil Rights Act continues into the
present. Courts consistently examine numerous variables in deter-
mining whether a club is private. Decisions in recent cases based on
state public accommodation laws reveal that several important factors
are emerging that are pertinent to a consideration of a club's status
as private or public.
State Legislation
By 1977 twenty-one states" 4 had enacted statutes prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of sex in places of public accommodation.
Typically these statutes are patterned after the federal public accom-
109. See United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1968); Wright
v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1152 (S.D. Tex. 1970); United States v. Johnson
Lake Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (S.D. Ala. 1970); United States v. Jack Sabin's
Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90, 94 (E.D. La. 1967).
110. See Gillespie v. Lake Shore Golf Club, Inc., 56 Oh. Abs. 222, 91 N.E.2d
290 (Ohio, Ct. App. 1950).
111. See United States v. Northwest Louisiana Restaurant Club, 256 F. Supp. 151,
153 (W.D. La. 1966); Williams v. Rescue Fire Co., 254 F. Supp. 556, 561 (D. Md.
1966).
112. See United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370 (E.D. La. 1969); United States v. Northwest
Louisiana Restaurant Club, 256 F. Supp. 151 (W.D. La. 1966).
113. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 304 (1969); United States v. YMCA, 310
F. Supp. 79, 80 (D.S.C. 1970). But see United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370,
373 (E.D. La. 1969).
114. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.230 (1974); CAL. Cry. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1977);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-501 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35 (West Supp.
1977); DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 4504 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 509.101 (West Supp.
1977); IDAHO CODE § 67-5909 (1973); IowA CODE ANN. § 601A.7(1)(a) (West
1975); KAN. STAT. § 44-1002 (Supp. 1976); LA. CONST. art. 1, § 12; ME. REV. STAT.
tit. 5, § 4591 (Supp. 1976-77); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (West Supp.
modations law but include sex as a protected classification. Cases
brought under several of these state laws have suggested that im-
portant criteria, previously overlooked, should be considered in any
analysis of the extent to which a club is truly private. The most
significant of these factors to a discussion of sex discrimination in
private clubs is the commercial nature of the club.
One of the first intimations of the significance of commercialism
as a factor in a determination of the private club's status appeared in
a case involving the Elks Club and its discriminatory practice of ex-
cluding blacks from membership. 115 Although the decision upheld
the private status of the club, it made a point of addressing the issue
of commercialism in private clubs. Writing for the majority, Judge
Blumenfeld appended this important caveat:
Those who believe that racial exclusion fosters fraternity are free
to act out their belief, but they may not promote prejudice for
profit. If a lodge were to diverge [from its social purpose] and
become an establishment where economic activity was the at-
traction, it would cease to be exempt: To have their privacy
protected, clubs must function as extensions of members' homes
and not as extensions of their businesses. Racial prejudice will
not be permitted to infect channels of commerce under the guise
of 'privacy." "
Some of the ways in which individual jurisdictions are approaching
the problem of the quasi-private commercial club 1 7 may be seen in
cases arising in New York, Pennsylvania, and California.
New York
The commercial aspect of a private club that excludes women as
members was at issue in the New York case of Kiwanis Club of Great
1977-78); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8(IV) (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
10:1-2 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-7 (F) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
(McKinney) § 40; OR. REv. STAT. § 30.675 (1975); 43 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. 43 §
953 (Purdon) (Supp. 1977-78); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-3 (Supp. 1977); W. VA.
CODE § 5-11-9(f) (Supp 1976); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 942.04 (West Supp. 1977-78).
115. Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of the Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D.
Conn. 1974).
116. Id. at 1204.
117. A commercial club may be a place where businessmen congregate to transact
or to facilitate the transaction of business, such as a businessman's luncheon club,
a club which is actually in business, or a combination of the two. The IRS has
specified the criteria that determine if a club is commercial. See I.R.M. HANDBOOK
23, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS HANDBOOK §§ 700-800 (1975); see notes 157-65 & accom-
panying text infra. The San Francisco Bar Association has proposed that a business
club is "[A]ny club which is principally or substantially used by its members to enter-
tain in connection with their business or profession or to conduct business or profes-
sional activities." Proposed Amendment to Resolution 9-6, San Francisco Bar Ass'n.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
November 1977] SEX DISCRIMINATION IN PRIVATE CLUBS 439
Neck, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Kiwanis International.118 The New
York Human Rights Law that was involved provides that it is an
unlawful discriminatory practice to discriminate in any place of public
accommodation on the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, sex,
disability, or marital status.1 19
Plaintiff in this case was a local chapter of Kiwanis that had ad-
mitted women to membership in the club in spite of the provisions of
the International Constitution restricting membership to men. Once
women were admitted the International's Board of Trustees revoked
the local club's charter. After this action was sustained by the General
Convention of the International Body in June of 1975120 the local sued
for a declaratory judgment to nullify the provisions of the Kiwanis
constitution that restrict membership to men. The trial court's de-
cision to refuse nullification was sustained by the Appellate Division. 121
Plaintiffs sought to show that Kiwanis is not a truly private club
within the meaning of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the New York
Human Rights Law and is thus subject to the proscriptions of the
Acts.122  In support of their contention plaintiffs offered to prove that
Kiwanis meetings are opened by having each member state his name
and firm association, that many business organizations, including banks,
pay their employees' dues, and that the contacts made at meetings
aid members in developing sales and other business.123  Plaintiff's
theory was that Kiwanis, far from being distinctly private, was "an
organization which acts as a forum in which members seeking busi-
ness and professional opportunities meet and advance their individual
corporate, economic and commercial interests ...."124
The trial court compared the objectives of the Kiwanis Club set
118. 52 App. Div. 2d 906, 383 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1976) (mem.), aff'g 83 Misc. 2d
1075, 374 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1975).
119. N.Y. EXEc. LAw § 296(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
120. 83 Misc. 2d at 1076, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
121. 52 App. Div. 2d 906, 383 N.Y.S.2d 383.
122. Plaintiff also alleged that the discriminatory membership policies violated
New York General Business Law § 340, which prohibits unlawful interference with
the free exercise of activity in the conduct of any business. This argument was dis-
missed. 83 Misc. 2d at 1077, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
123. 83 Misc. 2d at 1076-77, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 266-67. See also J. Shapiro's dis-
sent noting that corporations, utilities, and banking institutions pay dues of employee
members and deduct the payments. 52 App. Div. 2d at 909, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
The dissent quotes from a bank's statement that it paid expenses and dues for its
employees to be members of service clubs: "It is important to the bank's business
for its bank managers to participate in community affairs, and these activities provide
significant opportunities for the cultivation of new business." Id. at 910, n.1, 383
N.Y.S.2d at 287. For a discussion of the legality of such dues payments, see notes
168-74 & accompanying text infra.
124. 52 App. Div. 2d at 906-07, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
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forth in the International's constitution with the criteria that cases
had developed for qualification as a truly private club 125 and con-
cluded that Kiwanis fell more to the home side of the line than to
the business side of the line: "The fact that individual members may
use their membership in a club to further their own business interests
does not, in any way, change the avowed purposes of the organization,
or convert it into a commercial club." 126
This holding is questionable on several grounds. 1 2  First, the
court relies in part upon the lack of commercial objectives in the con-
stitution of Kiwanis International to support its holding that Kiwanis
is truly private;12 8 because the Kiwanis constitution does not recite
that it is a commercial club, however, does not mean that it cannot
be one. The court's argument seems to beg the question, for as Judge
Shapiro observed in one portion of his lengthy dissent to the Kiwanis
decision:
Nothing in the stated objects of the International [constitution]
indicates that it meets the standards of a purely 'private club.'
To define a 'private club' as being one 'not in fact open to the
public' is to allow every club to become 'private' merely by barring
some small segment of the public. It is a limitation which carries
within itself the seed of its own easy evasion." 9
A second ground upon which the Kiwanis decision may be ques-
tioned is the court's reliance upon the holdings in the Jaycee cases. 130
In each of these cases the court upheld discriminatory charter pro-
visions that restricted membership in the Junior Chamber of Commerce
organizations to men. The Kiwanis court interpreted the Jaycee de-
cisions as dispositive of the commercialism issue: "It should be noted
that the Jaycees is actually a Junior Chamber of Commerce whose
prime object is to further the business interests of its members. Thus,
the decisions involving Jaycees are of considerable significance in the
light of plaintiffs' claims of commercialism."'131  The Jaycee decisions,
however, were based upon a failure to find significant state involve-
ment with the clubs and not upon a finding that the Jaycees were
centers of commercial activity. Thus, the Kiwanis court confuses a
125. 83 Misc. 2d at 1077, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 267. The Kiwanis court relied upon
the criteria outlined in Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1151 (S.D. Tex.
1970): "1. Concern or plan for the selection of members. 2. Standards of plan for
the screening of prospective members. 3. Use of facilities primarily by members only.
4. Club members dictate the policies of the club. 5. Nonprofit and/or noncommercial
purpose in the forming of the club."
126. 83 Misc. 2d at 1078, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
127. See also J. Shapiro's dissent in 52 App. Div. 2d at 906, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
128. 83 Misc. 2d at 1077, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
129. 52 App. Div. 2d at 909, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
130. See notes 55-71 & accompanying text supra.
131. 83 Misc. 2d at 1079, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 269 (citation omitted).
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finding of no state action in the Jaycee cases with the separate question
of whether a particular club is or is not private because it is used
largely for commercial purposes. Logically, the two questions are
separate issues.
Despite the result, the Kiwanis court implies that a private club
that is primarily commercial in nature and that has a discriminatory
membership policy is subject to attack. Thus, the question of a club's
status as private should involve a consideration of the extent to which
the club is a center of commercial activity.
Pennsylvania
One variation on the commercial theme is that a private club may
lose its status as private and become a place of public accommodation
because of its guest policies. This was argued in Commonwealth,
Human Relations Commission v. Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge No.
107.132 Because Mr. Irvis, after he was refused service by the Moose
Lodge, simultaneously filed suit in federal court,133 on the state action
theory, and in state court, 34 alleging violation of the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act, the state court faced the same factual situation
as was presented in Moose Lodge.3 5 The Pennsylvania Act provides
that it is an unlawful practice for a fraternal corporation or association,
unless based upon membership, to discriminate on the basis of race
or color.1 3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court unanimously reversed'3 7 the
lower court's holding that the Moose Lodge was not a place of public
accommodation within the meaning of the Act. The court held that
the purpose of the private club exemption clause of the statute was to
protect the privacy and exclusiveness expected by the members of
private clubs. 138  These interests were compromised by the club's
policy of permitting any caucasian member of the public who was an
132. 448 Pa. 451, 294 A.2d 594 (1972).
133. Irvis v. Scott, 318 F. Supp. 1246 (M.D. Pa. 1970), rev'd sub noma. Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
134. 448 Pa. 451, 294 A.2d 594 (1972).
135. See notes 40-44 & accompanying text supra.
136. 43 PA. CoN. STAT. ANN. § 955 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78), construed in 294
A.2d at 597. A 1969 amendment included sex as a protected classification. Amend-
ment of July 9, 1969, Pub. L. 133, § 1.
137. 448 Pa. 451, 294 A.2d 594 (1972). After Irvis filed his complaint with the
Human Relations Commission, it ordered the lodge to cease discrimination. The
Court of Common Pleas, Dauphin County, No. 216 (C.D. 1969) reversed the Com-
mission. The reversal was upheld by the Superior Court, 220 Pa. Super. 356, 286
A.2d 374 (1971). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 448 Pa. 451, 294 A.2d 594
(1972), unanimously reversed and held Moose Lodge could not continue its discrim-
inatory guest practices.
138. 448 Pa. at 458-59, 294 A.2d at 597-98.
invited guest of a member, regardless of his eligibility for membership,
to use the club's facilities. 13 9  The court found the club's policy of
excluding one portion of the public under the guise of being private
while simultaneously opening its doors to the rest of the public irrec-
oncilable with a finding that the club was private within the meaning
of the statute. 140
The distinction made by the court between the lodge's discrimin-
ation as to its guest policy and as to its membership policy is an
important one.' 41  If Moose Lodge facilities were rented by groups
for social or political functions unrelated to the private club the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court would assume that the lodge was nondis-
criminatory. 42  On the occasion of Mr. Irvis's visit, when the facilities
were opened to members and their guests only, the court found the
private club to be a place of public accommodation. Because the
discriminatory activity was based upon guest policy and not upon
membership policy it was prohibited. 143  Both by leasing the club's
facilities and opening the club to guests the members had forfeited
their rights of exclusive association and had overstepped the Act's
immunity.144
This issue of the application of public accommodation statutes to
guest and membership policies of private clubs raises at least two sig-
nificant considerations for other jurisdictions.145  The first is the extent
139. Id., 294 A.2d at 598.
140. Id.
141. The court noted: "That is not to say that under the act the lodge may not
discriminate in whatever manner it pleases in determining its qualifications for mem-
bership. Having gone beyond that point, however, and made its facilities available
to nonmembers, it may not do so on a discriminatory basis in violation of the Human
Relations Act." 448 Pa. at 460, 294 A.2d at 598.
142. This presumption is not always valid, as was indicated by the facts in Batavia
Lodge No. 196 v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 143, 316 N.E.2d
318, 359 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1974), aff'g 43 App. Div. 2d 807, 350 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1973).
In that case a New York chapter of the Moose Lodge permitted a fashion show to
be held at its facilities for invited guests. Although all guests were admitted, only
caucasian guests were permitted to use the bar facilities. This discrimination was
described as "blatant and intolerable." 35 N.Y.2d at 145, 316 N.E.2d at 319, 359
N.Y.S.2d at 26. The New York Supreme Court concluded that during the fashion show
the club was a place of public accommodation within the meaning of the New York
Human Rights Law. 43 App. Div. 2d at 810, 350 N.Y.S. at 276.
143. During the Commonwealth litigation the national body of the Loyal Order
of Moose amended its general laws to limit guests to those who would be eligible for
membership. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 178 n.6 (1971); Com-
monwealth Human Relations Commission v. Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge No. 107,
448 Pa. 451, 294 A.2d 594, 596 n.2 (1972).
144. 448 Pa. at 458-59, 294 A.2d at 598.
145. Whether a club should lose its private status in any of the following situa-
tions depends upon the construction of the applicable state statute: if the club were
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of the discrimination practiced by a particular club. For example,
some clubs absolutely do not permit women in the club as guests or
as members; others restrict use of the facilities by women to certain
occasions, hours, or days, and to designated elevators, rooms, and
stairways; finally, there are those that permit women to be brought
in as guests at any time, but that do not permit women to be members
in their own right.146  Second, some consideration must be given to
the federal and state law that is applicable to the club. Some states
such as Pennsylvania specifically exempt membership policies of pri-
vate clubs in their public accommodations statutes. In those states
a private club may retain a discriminatory membership policy whereas
a discriminatory guest policy may be declared unlawful. If other
states do not have this limitation the same arguments and questions
that arise under federal statutory law are applicable. 147
The Commonwealth decision is significant first because it points
out the importance of guest-membership distinctions in the analysis
of state public accommodations laws. Second, the court by holding
that members of a private club forfeit their freedom of association when
members bring guests to the club noted that as a result of its guest
policy a private club may become a place of public accommodation.
California
Another variation on the commercial theme is the theory that a
private club through its activities and guest policies may become a
quasi-business establishment. In California the public accommoda-
tions law is framed in terms of the commercial nature of an establish-
ment: All persons within the jurisdiction are free and equal and are
entitled to full access to all business establishments of every kind.148
open to any male guest, if it were rented to an organization whose members were
all male, or if it were open to only the male members of an outside organization.
146. The weight afforded to the interest in private association will vary according
to the first factor in the equation. The freedom of association arguments would ap-
pear to be the strongest in the case of a club that does not permit women in the club
as members or as guests. Once women have been admitted, however, it may be
argued that the members have forfeited their freedom of association because they may
no longer control who comes into the club. This raises another question: If a male-
only private club even once permits its facilities to be used by females have the mem-
bers forfeited their first amendment freedom of association for all time?
147. Policy considerations and other factors that may be considered include: (1)
What is the purpose of the club - is it a place where males go to enjoy exclusively
male company or a place where business is transacted? (2) Who pays the dues -
the member, or the member's employer? (3) Who are the guests - male friends, or
wives and female friends, or clients? (4) Who uses the facilities - members and
their guests, or disinterested groups who conduct community functions, receptions, con-
ferences or meetings?
148. CAL. Civ. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1977).
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Although the statute's application to "all business establishments
of every kind whatsoever" is uncertain, 149 a currently pending suit
may test its applicability to a private club.150 In 1974, some com-
missioners of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission,
which was meeting in Eureka, were invited by a member to take an
informal tour of the Ingomar Club, a local private club. A female
commissioner requesting to join the tour was denied entry to the club
and was informed that women are allowed on the premises only for
special occasions, parties, and on Sundays. After the commissioner
complained of this incident to the California Attorney General, the
Attorney General sued the Ingomar Club' 5' alleging that its dis-
criminatory guest policies violate section 51 of the Unruh Civil Rights
Act and that the club had become a quasi-business establishment by
allowing use of its facilities for business, civic, and political functions
such as meetings, banquets, and receptions.' 5 2
Judicial construction of statutory variations on public accommo-
dations laws indicates commercialism is emerging as an important fac-
tor in determining the status of private clubs. The full potential of
this factor as a consideration has not yet been realized and the impact
of the factor of commercialism in private club litigation awaits judicial
determination.
Alternative Approaches
Judicial, legislative, and individual approaches are available for
alleviating unjustifiable discrimination by private clubs. Foremost in
the realm of alternative approaches is the development in the judiciary
of an awareness and sensitivity to the changing role of women in our
society.153 If courts are to fairly evaluate competing interests it is fun-
damental that the rapidly evolving status of women be appreciated. 54
149. It is suggested that the term business establishments not only incorporates
but amplifies the meaning of places of public accommodation in order to prevent
psychological injury that may not occur in public view. Horowitz, The 1959 Cali-
fornia Equal Rights in "Business Establishments" Statute - A Problem in Statutory
Application, 33 S. CAL. L. RE.v. 260, 279 (1960).
150. See Murphy, Men-Only Club Policy Challenged, L.A. Times, July 2, 1974,
pt. IV, at 1, col. 2.
151. People v. Ingomar Club, No. 56006 (Humboldt County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
1974).
152. Id.
153. The district court in Rhode Island, for example, noted that "[iut would be
male chauvinistic blindness not to recognize the progress females have made during
the last quarter century in their battle for equality." Women's Liberation Union of
Rhode Island, Inc. v. Israel, 379 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.R.I. 1974).
154. "To adhere to practices supported by ancient chivalristic concepts, when
there may no longer exist a need or basis therefor, may only serve to isolate women
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In the area of federal legislative reform numerous alternatives are
available. First is the proposed equal rights amendment which would
give Congress the power to legislate to end sex discrimination in the
private sector.155 A more immediate solution is the amendment of
the federal public accommodations law, Title II of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, to include sex as a protected classification.' 6 Such an
amendment would relieve courts of the complexities of the constitu-
tional analysis and would enable them to proceed under direct federal
statutory authority to eradicate sex discrimination in private clubs
that are places of public accommodation.
Private clubs may also be regulated through the federal power
to tax. 157  Under existing law a private club is exempt from taxation
if it is operated for "pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable pur-
poses . . ."8 and this exemption extends to social and recreational
clubs supported solely by membership dues, fees, and assessments. 5 9
The ostensible purpose of such a provision is to segregate those
clubs that operate for recreation and pleasure from those that operate
as businesses. Those that are found to operate as businesses lose
their tax exempt status. A quasi-private club, which is in fact a busi-
ness under the tax codes, is thus faced with the option of curtailing
its public-business activities or losing its tax exempt status.
The determination of a club's tax status as private or public may
have important implications for a club's status with respect to various
public accommodations statutes. In a *state such as California, where
sex discrimination is prohibited in "business establishments," a deter-
mination that a club is a business for tax purposes should be an im-
portant consideration in determining a club's status as a business
establishment. In other states, in which sex discrimination is prohi-
bited more generally in a place of public accommodation, this same
from the realities of everyday life, and to perpetuate, as a matter of law, economic
and sexual exploitation." Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 308 F. Supp.
1253, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
155. See note 85 supra.
156. Because the Civil Rights Act is supported by the power of Congress to legis-
late under the commerce clause, that Act could be amended to include sex along with
race, color, religion, and national origin. See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). A similar amendment has been proposed for
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. H.R. 407, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
157. See generally Note, Developing Legal Vistas for the Discouragement of Pri-
vate Club Discrimination, 58 IovA L. REv. 108 (1972).
158. I.R.C. § 501(c)(7).
159. [1976] STAND. FsD. TAx REP. (CCH) f[ 3040. No statutory definition of
"club" is provided by the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.M., EXEMPr O.RGANIZATIONS
HANDBOOK § 721(1), but the Service has indicated that "club" implies the "existence
of personal contact, commingling, and fellowship among members." Id.
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reasoning should apply to show that a club that is a business cannot
also be private.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976160 made two significant changes in
the requirements for tax exempt status for social clubs. First, "sub-
stantially all" of a club's activities must be for pleasure, recreation,
and other nonprofit purposes. 16' Such an organization may earn a
limited amount of income from nonmember sources and may have a
limited amount of investment income. 162
One of the guidelines used in a determination of a club's exempt
status is the extent to which the club's facilities are used by the general
public. Under the "minimum gross receipts standard" gross receipts
from general public use of club facilities that exceed $2,500 or five
percent of a club's total gross receipts may reflect the existence of a
nonexempt purpose to engage in business.1 63
The effectiveness of this standard, however, is questionable be-
cause its application is dependent upon a number of assumptions that
the guidelines make as to the status of nonmembers, 6 4 because the
standard is so low, and because even if the standard is exceeded, other
circumstances will be considered, such as the purpose and frequency
of public use of club facilities, before a club will lose its tax exempt
status.165 Reformation of these guidelines is necessary in order to
identify those clubs that purport to be private and yet receive sub-
stantial income from the public.
The second significant change in the requirement for tax exempt
status of social clubs relates to discriminatory practices. A private
club will lose its tax exempt status if its charter, bylaws, or any written
policy statements contain a provision for discrimination against any
person on the basis of race, color, or religion. 66 The reason given
for this change is that the national policy dictates that it is inappro-
priate for a private club to be exempt from taxation if its policy is to
160. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525 (1976).
161. [1977] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) if 3041.01. Previous law required
private organizations to be operated "exclusively" for these purposes. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at if 3041.013.
164. Three assumptions are made:
(1) Where eight or fewer people use the club's facilities and at least one is a
member, it is assumed that the nonmembers are the member's guests (and not "gen-
eral public"), provided the payment for such use is by the member or his employer.
(2) Where 75% or more of a group using the facility are members, the same
presumption applies where payment is by the member or his employer.
(3) In other situations, the host-guest status is not assumed and must be sub-
stantiated. Id.
165. See id.
166. Id. at if 3041.01.
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discriminate on the basis of race, color, or religion.167  Discrimination
on the basis of sex is not among the classifications that will prevent a
club's achieving tax exempt status. Because there is no logical reason
for its exclusion, the statute should be amended to include sex among
the prohibited classifications.
Another approach to the regulation of private clubs would be
in governmental control of employers' payment of privite club mem-
bership dues of employees. 168  The authority for such control may
come from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 69 which prohibits dis-
crimination against sex in employment, or it may come from the Office
of Federal Contract Compliance, which is charged with assuring equal
employment opportunities without regard to sex for all persons em-
ployed with government contractors and subcontractors. 170 The ques-
tion of the legality of dues payment to clubs with discriminatory
membership policies has been raised with regard to banks that contract
with the federal government to sell savings bonds and that act as tax
collection agents. 71  The potential impact 72 in the private sector is
illustrated by Bank of America's announcement that it will discontinue
reimbursing executives for dues paid to all male clubs because to do
so would be incompatible with its policy of being an equal opportunity
employer.173  Although regulatory power exists 74 for state control of
employers who pay employees' dues in private clubs that discriminate
it has yet to be exercised.
Because the service of liquor is often an important incident to a
club's social activities, the grant or denial of a liquor license is viewed
as a powerful state leverage device. California is attempting to capi-
talize on this leverage in two ways. Assembly Bill 419 introduced in
167. LwmAL REV. Acrs, TEXr & LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2005 (1976).
168. See U.S. Bars Banks Paying Dues to Men-Only Clubs, Wall St. J., April 26,
1976, at 10, col. 3; Social Clubs Feel the Bias Squeeze, Busmss WEFx, July 19, 1976,
at 24; Burke, Big Flap Over Club Memberships, BAsNKuxc, July 1976, at 3; Private
Clubs Target for Labor Dept. Action, INusmY WEK, Mar. 14, 1977, at 32.
169. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
170. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.1.
171. U.S. Bars Banks Paying Dues to Men-Only Clubs, Wall St. J., April 26, 1976,
at 10, col. 3.
172. "Since many social clubs (such as businessmen's luncheon clubs) and service
clubs (such as Kiwanis and Lions) depend heavily on employer-paid dues, such a
ruling would in effect give them the choice of opening their membership to women
and minorities, persuading all their members to pay their own dues, or going out
of business. All the major service clubs and many social clubs exclude women. A
smaller number exclude minorities." Social Clubs Feel the Bias Squeeze, BusINFSs
WEEK, July 19, 1976, at 24.
173. Twilight Comes to the All-Male Business Club, Busnrss WEEK, Dec. 20,
1976, at 65.
174. See notes 169-70 & accompanying text supra.
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February, 1977, would prohibit the issuance of a liquor license to any
club that restricts membership or use of facilities on the basis of "color,
race, religion, ancestry, national origin or sex."'- 5 Alternate draft
legislation under consideration would amend the state's licensing pro-
visions to provide disciplinary measures if clubs discriminate in guest
policies with respect to business, civic, and political functions on club
premises.'7 G
Various local government entities have also taken steps to regulate
discriminatory policies of private clubs. For example, an ordinance
passed by the City of San Francisco prohibits leasing publicly owned
property to clubs that have discriminatory policies.177
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, action by individuals,
especially in the business sector, may contribute to the eradication of
sex-based private club discrimination. Some large companies are be-
ginning to question membership policies of clubs in which its execu-
tives are members.' 78 Others, such as the Bank of America, have
stopped reimbursing executives for membership dues in all male
clubs,179 while Transamerica Corporation, Wells Fargo Bank, and the
Los Angeles County Bar Association have refused to hold meetings
or events at clubs that have discriminatory policies.1 80
175. Cal. A.B. 519, Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. 1977-78, introduced Feb. 15, 1977. The
proposed legislation provides:
"(a) No license shall be issued to any club pursuant to this article if the club
in any manner restricts membership or the use of its facilities on the basis of a
person's color, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, or sex.
(b) No club licensed pursuant to this article shall in any manner restrict mem-
bership or the use of its facilities on the basis of a person's color, race, religion, an-
cestry, national origin, or sex.
(c) Violation of this section shall constitute grounds for the suspension or
revocation of such license.
(d) Violation of this section shall not constitute a crime.
(e) The prohibitions of this section shall be in addition to any other prohibition
established by law."
176. Copies of alternate draft legislation may be obtained from the San Francisco
office of the Attorney General, Constitutional Rights Unit.
177. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE, ch. 12C, Ordi-
nance No. 84-77 (1977), Nondiscrimination in Property Contracts. This ordinance
prohibits discrimination on the basis of "race, color, creed, national origin, ancestry,
age, sex, sexual orientation or disability .... ... Id. at 1.
178. Twilight Comes to the All-Male Business Club, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 20,
1976, at 65.
179. Id.
180. Id. The Resolution adopted by the Board of Trustees of the Los Angeles
County Bar Ass'n on Dec. 11, 1974, does not equivocate:
"WHEREAS, The Los Angeles County Bar Association does not have restrictive
membership or guest policies based upon an individual's race, sex, religion, or national
origin and does not wish to lend its support to such policies;
THEREFORE, it is resolved and affirmed that no meeting or event of the Los
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Private clubs will be affected by these individual efforts to equal-
ize access to private clubs, especially if club revenues or prestige de-
pend upon meetings of local businesses. These individual efforts
should at least result in an increased awareness by private clubs and
their members of the growing national concern over the tradition of
discrimination against women.
Conclusion
The woman's cause is man's. They rise or sink together; dwarfed
or godlike, bond or free; if she be small, slight-natured, miserable,
how shall men grow?
-Alfred Lord Tennyson.'81
Private clubs continue to play a significant role in the shameful
tradition of discrimination against women in this country. Although
many of the clubs that exclude women are genuinely private and should
be protected, many are essentially public and should not be protected.
Constitutional attack upon private clubs that discriminate against
women is virtually futile. Some promise of relief lies in judicial in-
terpretation of state public accommodations statutes, but this remains
to be fully explored. Various alternative approaches to be taken by
the judiciary, by federal and state legislative bodies, and by indi-
viduals have been proposed, but relief awaits implementation of such
proposals.
Private clubs remain an important element in every community.
The exclusion of women, whether by tradition, inertia, or fear, results
in their frequent isolation from participation in commercial and com-
munity activities. This isolation in turn inhibits their social, economic,
and political mobility within society. This arbitrary exclusion of wom-
en from any segment of community life, simply because they are not
men, is detrimental not only to women who are immediately affected
but ultimately to our total society.
I. Lucretia Hollingsworth*
Angeles County Bar Association, its sections, committees or their officers shall be
conducted at clubs or other facilities which discriminate on the basis of race, religion,
sex or national origin."
181. Quoted in Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593,
606 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
0 B.A., 1969, California State University at Northridge. Member, Third Year
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